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I. Introduction[1]
{1} The authors of this book have brought together a vast and varied array of experience. Mr. Thorne is the
Vice President & Associate General Counsel for Bell Atlantic; Mr. Huber is a Senior Fellow at the Manhattan
Institute for Policy Research; and Mr. Kellogg is a Partner at Kellogg, Huber, Hansen & Todd.
{2} A reader will find the occasional use of technical jargon, such as "domsats" (domestic satellites), "coax"
(coaxial cable), and "syndex" rules (syndicated exclusivity rules to protect syndicated, non-network
programming) to be somewhat confusing. "Telcos" and "cablecos" are telephone and cable companies,
respectively. Overall, however, technical jargon is well explained for such a comprehensive look at the hightech telecommunications field. After defining the "telecosm" as the universe of telecommunications and
computers, the text moves into a comprehensive technical, regulatory, and legal analysis of the telecosm's
short- and long-term future.

II. Discussion
A. Chapter 1 - Introduction
{3} The Introduction provides a taste of the detail and breadth of what the authors have included in the book.
They note that the present state of the law "is a mess" and seems "to have emerged from a sausage factory
operated by a fractious band of intoxicated butchers."[2] The unavoidable result is a dense, 827-page book
which the authors believe is necessary to give this subject the complete treatment. For example, a reader will
quickly become acquainted with two basic technological differences: wired and wireless communications.
Wired technology uses a wave guide, or wire, and is typically comprised of metal or fiber-optic glass which
sends more private signals along a specified path. Wireless technology, on the other hand, uses radio waves to
broadcast more publicly at varying strengths in three dimensions. Thus, wireless technology simultaneously
reaches more people than wired communications.[3] Assorted technologies, including satellite, telephone,
cable, radio, television, and microwave use different combinations of communication methods and varying
bandwidths[4] to rapidly communicate increasing amounts of information.[5] As users have different

technological needs and the regulatory scheme is constantly changing, the future path of telecosm is
expanding unpredictably.
{4} The authors predict that "tomorrow's telecosm will contain a 'network of networks,' an intricately
interconnected matrix of wireless, satellite, copper, coaxial, and glass."[6] They believe the Internet illustrates
the telecosm architecture of the future, where increasing competition and decreasing regulation will lead to
hybrid technologies bound together by layers of networks. From a pure engineering efficiency standpoint, the
population density and geography, along with other similar factors, will affect the outcome. For the time
being, however, there is a regulatory jungle blocking a more efficient market.
{5} The telecommunications industry is governed by many overlapping and superseding statutes, many of
which were directed at the state of the art technology of previous generations. They include the Wireless Ship
Act of 1910,[7] the Radio Act of 1912,[8] the Radio Act of 1927,[9] the Communications Act of 1934,[10]
the Communications Satellite Systems Act of 1962,[11] the Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984,[12]
the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992,[13] and the Children's Television
Act of 1990.[14] These are the primary federal statutes controlling the telecommunications field, but case law
and regulatory rulings are also important, and the authors have conveniently provided cites to the relevant
law. The book explores many of the legal regimes applying to this field, including the lability of broadcasters
and common carriers, taxation, franchising, Fifth Amendment takings law,[15] cross-ownership rules to
prevent multi-media monopolies,[16] vertical integration restrictions,[17] copyright protection for content,
[18] and First Amendment free speech law.[19]

B. Chapter 2 - Broadband Media
{6} Chapter Two, entitled "Broadband Media," explores the distinctions between wired and wireless media
and the technology that is shaping their current and future uses. The wired media began not with a bang, but
with the pulse of Samuel Morse's electronic telegraph and Alexander Graham Bell's telephone, while G.M.
Marconi developed a wireless device based on the works of James Clerk Maxwell and Heinrich Hertz.[20]
The first Morse-code telegraph operated at about three characters per second, or at twenty-four bits per
second (bps) in today's measurements.[21] From the telegraph onward, the capacity to transmit information
has increased, and is expected to continue increasing, at exponential rates. Today, an uncompressed color
television picture requires roughly 100 Mbps, approximately four million times the rate of the primitive
telegraph.[22]
{7} As for the future, the authors believe that glass, "the most capacious broadband medium operating
today," will become the mainstay of telecommunications due to continuing and rapid increases in the carrying
capacity of fiber-optic cable.[23] Recent technologies discussed in the book include low power television
(LPTV); multi-point distribution service (MDS); multichannel, multi-point distribution service (MMDS); and
local multi-point distribution service (LMDS).[24] One new technology, the Direct Broadcast Satellite
(DBS), has rapidly expanded since 1993 due to a minimum of regulatory restraints.[25] DBS is made
possible by compression technologies which is the use of mathematical algorithms to reduce the amount of
information required to describe and later transmit an image, document, or sound. This technology has also
spurred growth in existing technologies such as copper and copper-aluminum coaxial cables, in addition to
fiber-optic cable. For instance, digital compression permits DBS to deliver over 100 television channels
nationwide, far more than the present capacity of 32 channels.[26]
{8} Rapid advancements in computer technology have enabled phone networks and satellites, for instance, to
optimize the carrying capacity already in place. Computers are also an invaluable aid in improving
compression technology. Thus, 28.8 Kbps modems can achieve rates that are effectively several times faster

by applying compression algorithms. Additional advances to the telecommunications structure constantly
arise from deployment and enhancement of two-way broadband capabilities in existing networks. Interactive
video data services are one example of this, as is the long-awaited "video dialtone" that would supply a video
telephone link. Some phone companies in this country presently offer residential customers ISDN, which
supplies rapid modem-like communication capability. The authors imply that this is a very limited
technology, indicating that future networks will be connected by more advanced technologies currently in
use.[27]
{9} One interesting and persuasive theory set forth is that asymmetric networks will dominate in the future.
[28] The authors explain that a broadband line into a residence, coupled with a narrowband line back to the
service operator, will become the norm. The reasoning is that a residential user will require vast information
from service providers in the form of movies, on-line public records, stock quotes, live television, etc. On the
other hand, the user will send out only modest amounts of information in the form of viewing choice or
information retrieval selection. Since most people run 'information deficits' by taking in more than they
create, it is unnecessary for most private residences to have equivalent outward-bound broadband
capabilities.[29]

C. Chapter 3 - The Powers of the FCC
{10} "The Powers of the FCC" is the title of Chapter Three. The Federal Communications Commission
(FCC) is the preeminent regulator of broadband communication in the United States, with its primary
authority stemming from the Communications Act of 1934.[30] Satellites are regulated both domestically by
the FCC and internationally by the International Telecommunications Union (ITU).[31] The FCC has explicit
powers to regulate common carriers. Common carriers traditionally were subject to tariff schedules and were
not permitted to control content. The FCC's powers also include regulation of broadcasters, which
traditionally controlled content sent to the public at large. The FCC also has powers implied from the
statutory language to expand its ancillary jurisdiction. Without such ancillary jurisdiction, the FCC could not
regulate common carriers acting partly as broadcasters (by carrying channels with their own content). Nor
could it regulate broadcasters acting partly as carriers (by sending content to specifically targeted users, e.g.
by pay television or cable subscribers). The regulator's problems stem from the technological advances
described in Chapter Two, which are beyond those envisioned at the enactment of the Communications Act
of 1934. This lag in the enactment of laws, coupled with the rapid advances in technology, is partly
responsible for the legal "sausage factory."
{11} The definition of "broadcasting" in the Communications Act of 1934 has been the subject of much
litigation. Much of the case law has focused on the definition of the "public,"[32] and whether subscription or
pay television should be considered broadcasting--which it is presently not.[33] Cable television also slipped
through the regulatory cracks for many years. It could not be classified as a "broadcaster," due to the fact that
it used wire and thereby limited the possible audience to less than the general public. Case law eventually
forbade the FCC from classifying cable as a common carrier.[34] The lack of legislation regulating cable led
to the enactment of the 1984 Cable Act.[35]
{12} Certain new technologies fit within the original 1934 Communications Act framework. For regulatory
purposes, satellites are simply classified as "radio stations" that happen to be further off the ground. However,
even some types of satellites are not classified as broadcasters. One example is the DBS signal, which is
delivered straight to a particular user rather than being broadcast to the "public." Chapter Two discusses these
issues in great detail.
{13} The other major legal issue is federal versus state jurisdiction over various aspects of

telecommunications. The authors point to several jurisdictional maps used in different situations (1) the 50
states, (2) the 164 "local access and transport areas" (LATAS) that arose from antitrust litigation, (3) county
maps, which usually control cable franchises, and (4) 50-mile radius extensions from licensed broadcasters.
[36] Deciding which map to use for which telecommunications technology creates additional difficulties as
regulators try to obtain a piece of the tax revenue from licensing and franchising. This generally leads to a
regulatory structure where markets grow in different directions, and where engineering and economics are not
the primary factors.[37]
{14} Some of these jurisdictional answers are found in, or implied by, the Communications Act of 1934,
while others are constantly litigated in the courts. Federal broadcast regulation under the Act preempts state
wireless broadcast law. The authors believe FCC jurisdiction and frequency allocations are no longer as
necessary as they were in 1934, as technology permits greater control of broadcasts with a corresponding
decrease in interference problems.[38] Additionally, the 1984 Cable Act has helped enumerate certain FCC
powers while leaving to the states certain traditional areas such as libel, slander, obscenity, incitement,
invasion of privacy, and false or misleading advertising. These issues frequently arise when intrastate
communications are involved, especially when the technology is part of an interstate capability. Needless to
say, many issues in this area are unresolved and remain ripe for future litigation. For this reason, practitioners
in this field would be wise to read Chapter Three carefully.

D. Chapter 4 - The Franchise
{15} Chapter Four surveys "The Franchise," beginning with the distinction that prior restraint, from
franchises to licenses to permits, is standard among non-print media. The authors argue that although the First
Amendment should probably apply with equal force to electronic media acting as the press, it typically
protects only paper and ink.[39] Presumably, the First Amendment is being read to include only print media
in its definition of "press," leaving all improvements in information dissemination technology unprotected by
the First Amendment simply due to their more recent development.[40] This reviewer finds it interesting that,
while much of the U.S. Constitution has been dynamically interpreted, as a generalization it appears that the
present-day First Amendment interpretation of the "press," along with the Seventh Amendment right to a jury
trial, remain firmly rooted in 1791. Furthermore, if First Amendment protections are statically interpreted to
apply only to the written press, the potential replacement of newspaper by new electronic media would curtail
a significant portion of First Amendment protection.
{16} The authors suggest that the government regulates non-print media primarily because of (1) physical
scarcity of the wireless spectrum, (2) natural monopoly theory, such that money would be wasted installing
duplicate sets of wires, and (3) desire to promote price averaging and universal service, where a monopolist
could more easily be forced to charge the same average price to all, forcing low-cost users to subsidize highcost users.[41] Another justification given for pervasive regulation of the broadcast spectrum is that because
this mode of expression is not open to everyone, and because only a limited fraction of applicants may obtain
licenses, the government must regulate them as public trustees.[42] Nonetheless, the government has been
gradually loosening the regulatory reigns, i.e., permitting competition among inter- and intrastate telephone
services.[43] This is partly due to the fact that "satellites and cable have since shattered the oxymoronic
notion that the mission of broadcasting is to keep information close to home."[44] Franchisees, of course, still
must concern themselves with the federal antitrust laws under the Sherman and Clayton Acts. In sum, the
authors propose that property rights and anti-trespassing rules regarding spectrum usage are more desirable
than licenses.[45]

E. Chapter 5 - Common Carriage
{17} Chapter Five examines "Carriage." The basic principle of communications common carriage is fairness.
Everyone may obtain service from the carrier at preannounced rates. In exchange, the common carrier is
insulated from libel, copyright infringement, or other misuses of its medium. The public also benefits from
other conditions imposed on common carriers, including "must carry," "equal access," and "public access"
provisions.[46] The equal access provisions are a recent development that force certain common carriers to
provide access to other common carriers.[47] Satellites, for instance, currently have the ability to choose
operation as a common or private carrier or a broadcaster, although under the 1992 Cable Act they are still
subject to some minimal regulation such as political broadcasting rules.[48]
{18} On the other hand, the Communications Act of 1934 specifically forbids the FCC from imposing
common carrier duties on broadcasters so as to prevent monopolization.[49] In spite of this, carrier duties,
such as the fairness doctrine and equal time rules have been imposed upon broadcasters. These principles
require ample opportunity for the free and fair competition of opposing views for the public interest when
applied to political messages and to other important public issues. Although the FCC has frequently reversed
itself over use of the fairness doctrine, it was officially abandoned in 1981 as unnecessary in light of the
market reality at that time.[50] Equal time rules are a special-purpose fairness doctrine: they are intended
solely for political candidates and broadcaster editorials supporting a candidate, and have been codified in
Section 315 of the Communications Act of 1934.[51]
{19} Cable has been regulated as a common carrier since "must carry" rules in the early 1960s forced cable
companies to carry their broadcast competitors.[52] When case law held the "must carry" rules to be contrary
to the First Amendment, the FCC responded with a scaled back version that was eventually struck down
again in 1987.[53] Finally, the 1992 Cable Act reinstated mandatory "must carry" rules, forcing cable
operators with fewer than thirteen channels to carry at least three local broadcast stations an those with more
than twelve channels to devote up to one-third of their channels to the broadcast signals.[54] Other common
carrier type rules imposed on cable operators have included public access, leased channel rules, the fairness
doctrine, and equal time rules. These are all limited to some unclear extent by the First Amendment. The very
issue of whether carriers have any constitutional rights, and the extent of those rights, is likely to reach the
Supreme Court as carriers attempt to secure rights to broadcast their own programming rather than that of
their broadcast competitors.[55]
{20} The final issue examined under Chapter Five of the book is Fifth Amendment takings. These claims are
often alleged when the FCC orders the setting of low prices or orders access for competitors. Although courts
have been schizophrenic in this area, the authors maintain that "[i]t is equally clear that the demands for
'channels,' 'access,' and 'interconnection,' are demands for 'property' in the Fifth Amendment sense of the
word. . . . No one doubts that the Fourth Amendment applies to cyberspace. The Fifth Amendment surely
does too."[56] This issue may soon be resolved by an unhappy carrier forced to hand over access to its
bandwidth. On the other hand, as competition increases due to the decrease in regulation, a concomitant
reduction in "takings" may moot comprehensive treatment of the Fifth Amendment issue.
{21} The ultimate upshot of all the advances in telecosm technology is that common carriage is difficult to
keep well-defined. The result is that new broadband technologies, like cable and many other existing
technologies, will be subjected to the hybridized muddle of regulations just like a broadcaster or publisher
with some common carrier duties or a common carrier capable of broadcasting.[57]

F. Chapter 6 - Pricing

{22} Chapter Six considers "Pricing" as a means to control monopoly or promote universal service. The
problem, as expected, is that different broadband media are subject to varying degrees of price regulation.
The authors analogize the various means of distributing a film with the statement that "regulation of the price
of Pretty Woman will change as fast as one can walk the streets in the red-light district of the electronic
metropolis."[58] In general, however, pricing regulation is imposed on either the terminal equipment, the
conduit, or the content. Revenues are typically collectable from either the above sources, advertising, a cut of
sales conducted over the conduit, or any other means by which a customer may be willing to pay. It is rare to
find price regulation on telephone or other terminal equipment today, as the FCC abandoned such impractical
telephone equipment regulations in 1980.[59] The reasoning was that customer telephone equipment is not
really a "communication" service. Cable equipment, such as the television set-top box, is one exception to the
non-regulation of terminal equipment. The real difficulty with price regulation is that broadband
communication requires regulation of both equipment and conduit, and the failure to regulate one aspect
results in a shift in usage and costs toward that aspect.[60]
{23} Interestingly, federal pricing policy for television broadcasting has been that the end-user should pay
nothing. Instead, the broadcasters typically charge a price and make a profit through advertising. As for cable,
rate regulation has been an off-again, on-again affair. After being deregulated by the 1984 Cable Act (except
where subject to no effective competition), cable is presently regulated under the 1992 Cable Act.[61] Today,
the FCC presumes there is no effective competition until a cable operator shows otherwise. This permits price
regulation in the meantime.[62] Cable consumers will be interested in noting that the permissible rate of
return for cable investment is 11.25 percent, which is the same as for telephone companies.[63] This heavy
regulation creates incentives for cable programmers to focus development on unregulated non-video
programming, such as per-program billing or other new product types. Satellites, on the other hand, remain
virtually unregulated with respect to price.[64]
{24} Unfortunately, the authors wait until the end of the chapter to discuss theoretically the practical limits of
trying to regulate the price of fluctuating broadband technologies. This section points out that price regulation
of a service requires the service to first be defined in enough detail to prevent providers from changing the
price or evading the regulation by redefining the service provided. Since broadband technologies are
constantly evolving, the result is that price regulation cannot remain both fair and useful over a long period of
time. Of course, competition is growing as technology develops, consequently reducing the need for
extensive price regulation.

G. Chapter 7 - Cross-Ownership
{25} Chapter Seven explores "Cross-Ownership" restrictions. cross-ownership rules prevent an entity from
owning distinct media due to fear of monopolization. In the telecommunications area, it is generally a
"horizontal" aggrandizement of different media types capable of delivering the same message, such as
common ownership of a newspaper, radio broadcaster, and cable operator. The reasons for such rules vary,
including the prevention of domination, monopolization, or the obstruction of free speech. However, as
telecommunications markets evolve and new competitors enter the market, the need for such rules makes less
sense.
{26} Two of the rules promulgated by the FCC are the "duopoly" and "one-to-a-market" rules. The former
rule prevents ownership of two or more television or radio stations in one service market, while the latter
prevents cross-ownership of a television and a radio station in the same market.[65] In economic or antitrust
law terminology, these cross-ownership rules ban or limit horizontal mergers. The authors believe that the
existence of such regulations, such as for the new wireless local multipoint distribution services (LMDS),
initially inhibits rapid growth of new services because without such regulations the owner of an existing

service could more rapidly promote a similar new service.[66]
{27} One strong argument against cross-ownership rules is the example of schizophrenic lawmaking in the
broadcast television and cable area. At first, the FCC banned cross-ownership of a television station and a
cable system. Then, when cable systems began "importing" popular out-of-area television broadcasts, the
FCC ordered the "must carry" rules to require cable systems to carry local television. This was done initially
to ensure that cable would not overwhelm local broadcasters. The authors point to this example as ironic;
however, they could have been less kind and called it hasty decisionmaking. From a pure efficiency
standpoint, it would have been wiser to let the market develop before enacting overprotective regulations.
{28} Another example of burdensome cross-ownership regulation is the rule prohibiting local phone carriers
from expanding into video carriage, while permitting cable systems to expand into new markets by providing
competing telephone services. The only rational explanation, which is not discussed in the book, is that the
FCC believes that telephone carriers are a monopoly that can withstand competition, whereas the cable
systems are already competitive. However, their explanation belies reality, as most cable systems are
exclusive franchises. Thus, this is another unequal rule that blocks competition depending upon a company's
entry point into the telecommunications world. It seems a valid question to ask why one should be penalized
for beginning operations as a local telephone provider.
{29} The First Amendment debates in this area involve the appropriate standard of review: strict scrutiny or a
more lax standard. Also, there is debate over whether cross-ownership rules limit free speech more than
media monopolies. Proponents of cross-ownership rules argue that as long as the government regulates to
promote diversity in programming, the First Amendment is not violated. Opponents, however, argue that the
First Amendment specifically bars government regulation and interference with speech and the press.[67] The
issue is essentially whether a cross-owner will add a new programming roster or whether it will act as a
monopoly and drive other programmers out of business. The FCC and courts tend to favor such crossownership bans. The authors, however, cautiously conclude that "[p]reventing cross-ownership may prevent
monopoly. It may also prevent robust and efficient competition."[68]

H. Chapter 8 - Vertical Integration
{30} Chapter Eight provides insight on "Vertical Integration," the other fertile ground for antitrust-type
regulation in the telecommunications field. The issue here, as the authors relate it, is "[o]ught one who owns a
microphone be permitted to sing into it too?"[69] While the horizontal restraints discussed in Chapter Seven
address relations between competitors, this chapter focuses on relationships between suppliers and their
customers-typically distributors.
{31} Vertical integration can be efficient due to reduced transaction costs, such as contract negotiations and
economies of scale. This is because all transactions can be brought "in-house." Why then limit or ban vertical
relationships? Such regulations are typically justified by the alternative arguments: (1) the restrained party
has already relied on government powers of eminent domain to lay cable or other wires, to obtain exclusive
franchises, or to gain antitrust immunity, and must be hindered from drastically impeding competition; (2) the
restrained party will cross-subsidize its services by shifting unregulated costs into its regulated ones, thereby
recovering a monopolistic rate of return on more than was intended by the regulation; or (3) vertical
restraints, such as requiring equal access to essential facilities, are the only certain ways to prevent
discriminatory operations.
{32} The key issue here is whether market power in one service, coupled with ownership or interests in a
vertically linked service, will permit monopolization over that vertically linked service, also known as

"tying." Tying will only be possible if consumers are unwilling to switch to different products, or "substitute,"
should such vertical monopolization occur. One historical example discussed is the film studios' development
of distribution networks in the late 1910s.[70] With control over both supply and distribution, studios were
able to impose "block booking" requirements on theaters, forcing them to rent bad films along with the hits.
Much litigation and other policy-making frenzy followed for decades, with the end result in 1987 being that
vertical restrictions on this industry were no longer necessary.[71]
{33} As usual, vertical regulations are applied unevenly between the various telecommunications industries.
In 1970, the FCC enacted rules that effectively prohibited telephone companies from providing cable service
except for providing broadband channels to unaffiliated video programmers. In 1977, the FCC banned
television broadcast networks outright from owning cable systems. In the 1992 Cable Act, Congress included
"program access" provisions out of concern that cable programmers would favor affiliated cable system
operators. Even more recently, after investigation by the Department of Justice, Microsoft entered a consent
decree barring it from certain practices involving inclusion of undisclosed features in its software to provide
special advantage to its own developers. Since the mid-1980s, the FCC and the Department of Justice have
recommended repeal of the video carrying bans on telephone companies, a recommendation not yet taken by
Congress. As revealed by the sampling of vertical restraints above, the rules are not equal and are not even
enacted simultaneously.
{34} As with horizontal restraints, the constitutionality of vertical restraints is questionable under the First
Amendment. The Supreme Court has rejected the argument that vertical restraints can be rationalized as
being consented to upon entry into the industry.[72] As the authors indicate, the government can guarantee
equality of access to private property dedicated to public uses only up to the point where a property owner is
prohibited from deciding how to use her own property. Government-awarded franchises have rarely, if ever,
been conditioned on the waiver of First Amendment rights. The authors close this chapter by pointing out that
the "separation of content and conduit is still intellectually feasible but is increasingly impractical."[73] By
this, they appear to mean that regulators will not dole out red tape as easily in the future, as indicated by
instances of relaxed ownership rules that are already occurring.

I. Chapter 9 - Leviathan
{35} Chapter Nine is mysteriously entitled "Leviathan." Without revealing the secret, the chapter discusses
some of the mega-corporations in the telephone, network broadcast, and cable industries. The authors point to
much rhetoric concerning anti-"bigness" movements and Orwellian visions of seeing and controlling all.
However, they note that "'[d]eep pockets' or vast financial resources may facilitate anticompetitive conduct,
but they do not make it inevitable."[74] In general, this chapter discusses antitrust-type concerns over
corporate aggrandizement and responses, such as limits on ownership of stations, the now defunct "top 50"
market procedural obstacle rules, and private antitrust litigation regarding telephone companies. The irony is
that some business practices appear to be changing on their own. For example, AT&T, while once subject to
frequent litigation and divestiture decrees, has now voluntarily decided (as has IBM) to "self-divest" by
splitting into smaller groups to enhance efficiency and gain potential tax benefits.
{36} Other "bigness" concerns exist besides corporate size. The most important of these discussed is "patent
pooling." Patent pooling most notably arose in the film industry in the early 1900s, and in the telephone
industry by AT&T. Although the authors indicate that patent pooling can occur when one company acquires
all the ground-breaking and improvement on a new technology, there is another definition of patent pooling
that is more standard. That definition describes when competitors cross-license their patents. Balancing
antitrust concerns against the antitrust exception of patents to promote technological innovation is a delicate
task, and the authors assert that no coherent policy exists in this area.

{37} As for First Amendment discussion in this area, it parallels those discussed in cross-ownership and
vertical restraint regulations. The First Amendment does not bar large corporations by their size or number of
customers, yet the federal government uses antitrust law to regulate large companies. The authors point out
that if size were dispositive in limiting First Amendment rights, "the most effective, efficient, and popular
speakers would lose their right to speak simply by virtue of their popularity. Bill Cosby would have to be
silenced, because so many people enjoy what he says."[75] Of course, Mr. Cosby is not a great example
because he is not yet a corporation, to this reviewer's knowledge. However, the point is well taken: size
should not be everything when determining the scope of First Amendment rights. In completing the
discussion on "bigness" concerns, the authors note that "[t]he big are indeed getting bigger, but the market in
which they swim is growing even faster."[76] Overall, this chapter is the weakest link in the book. The ideas
discussed here could have been eliminated and the book would still contain the full, rich detail necessary to
define the telecommunications legal regime as it exists today.

J. Chapter 10 - Copyright and Piracy
{38} Chapter Ten examines in detail the "Copyright and Piracy" laws limiting content usage. As advancing
technology made the copying of original works of authorship easier, copyright law developed as a regime to
protect the incentive to create original works. The first copyright law was the English Statute of Anne in
1710, driven by the invention of the printing press.[77] The current Copyright Act is designed to permit
application of its principles to new technologies without having to wait for Congress to adjust the statute to
reflect those new technologies.[78] The problem for the Courts and Congress today is how to provide the
financial reward that protects the incentive to create, while rapidly advancing technology simplifies copying
so that "[e]very television, VCR, computer display, and hard disc is a device capable of misappropriating
intellectual property."[79] The unique nature of intellectual property is that it can be replicated at little cost
and used by many without reduction in value. As the authors point out, intellectual property "can be
misappropriated without the owner even noticing."[80]
{39} In telecommunications terms, the way content ownership is established and enforced will alter
consumer usage of broadband. Although copyright law in the past has tended to favor the content user, the
authors believe the legal emphasis of copyright must shift to protect the "incidents of private property," or the
copyright owner, as copying becomes effortless.[81] Copyright law since 1976 has clearly protected "original
works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression."[82] The copyright law grants the creator of
an original work of authorship that is "fixed" the exclusive rights to reproduce the work, distribute copies to
the public, prepare derivative works, and usually the rights to perform or display the copyrighted work.[83]
{40} Copyright law also protects specific expression based on a general idea, although the idea itself can not
be protected.[84] Unfortunately, broadband technologies make it virtually costless for a "multimedia tailor" to
alter an existing work, such as by audio sampling, video morphing, and software "look and feel" imitation, so
that distinguishing the idea from copied expression becomes difficult. For example, the authors hypothesize a
situation where such a "tailor" optically scans an author's text and edits the plot while keeping the author's
style and vocabulary identical.[85] Has the protected expression been copied? The problem for a copyright
owner is how to enforce the property right to make a "derivative work" if it is difficult to distinguish whether
the altered work is based on the expression, rather than just the idea.
{41} The authors examine several other copyright law doctrines and statutory provisions that weaken
copyright protection, and their potentially devastating effect in light of electronic and other broadband media.
The "fair use doctrine," a common law doctrine from 1841 now statutorily codified at 17 U.S.C. § 107,
permits use of private intellectual property by the public in certain circumstances. This doctrine permits
quoting, paraphrasing, and other borrowing to a certain hazy extent. For example, the fair use doctrine makes

this review of Federal Broadband Law possible without infringing its authors' copyright. The book also
discusses compulsory licensing for sound recordings, a scheme designed to benefit the public with increased
access to musical compositions, while decreasing the copyright value and ultimately the financial incentive
for the author, to create more works. Another legal provision explored is non-liability for a carrier that
passively retransmits content without "copying" it or exercising any control over content or selection.[86]
Any editing, such as deletion of advertising, may create liability for a carrier.
{42} In the telecommunications context, the authors believe divisions between carriage and publishing are
likely to blur.[87] This would create difficulties under the copyright law in determining which entities may
advantageously use the carrier exemption from copyright liability.[88] Several famous cases defining the
scope of "public performance" are discussed, resulting, by 1968, in a definition of "broadcast" as a
"performance" while excluding "reception" from that category. This created a blanket right for cable
companies to "download and retransmit programming at will."[89] Following this virtual elimination of
copyright law for cable operators, the FCC attempted to recreate protections for copyright owners in the form
of "syndicated exclusivity rules" and "non-duplication rules." Congress assisted in this effort when passing
the Copyright Act of 1976 by forcing cable companies to pay for retransmitted programming under a
compulsory licensing scheme and by defining "performance" to include both the initial showing and any
further acts by which the showing is communicated to the public.[90] The 1992 Cable Act strengthens the
hand of broadcasters even further by alternatively permitting them to demand carriage on local cable or
prohibiting retransmission absent consent.[91]
{43} Finally, the authors discuss other laws intended to protect content from theft. Common law
misappropriation, and perhaps unfair competition, protect a broadcaster in some states from signal theft by a
competitor or manufacturer of equipment usable solely for piracy. The Communications Act of 1934 also
prohibited interception of communications, except of those openly sent for the use of the general public.[92]
Congress arguably added additional cable anti-piracy protections in a 1984 Amendment to the Act.[93]
{44} In summarizing the state of copyright law as applied to telecommunications, the authors highlight two
trends in the law. The first is that "'signals' may not be intercepted and retransmitted without appropriate
consent."[94] This is essentially an expansion into the electronic realm of common law doctrines protecting
private property. The second trend is an attack on the advanced technology used by both pirates and the
telecommunications industry, i.e., satellite dishes, VCRs, and decoders. The authors suggest, however, that
the latter development is frivolous, because "[b]urning down the broadband mansion to roast the piracy piglet
is out of the question."[95] Ultimately, advanced broadband technologies create additional wealth to be
shared by all. Content owners might boost prices to reap profits. On the other hand, the authors submit that
prosperity is more likely to arrive in the form of a large sales volume slashing content prices, thereby making
content affordable for the masses.[96] This reviewer suspects, however, that content for the masses will
eventually pander to the masses to ensure popularity and prosperity.

K. Chapter 11 - Free Speech
{45} Chapter Eleven ties together the various threads of "Free Speech" and the First Amendment that were
discussed throughout the book. The courts have created what some describe as a "First Amendment Triad,"
with print publishers getting the most protection, broadcasters somewhat less protection, and carriers the least
protection.[97] Broadcast laws have proscribed obscene, indecent, and profane language from the beginning,
typically by denying license renewals if the programming had not been in "the public interest" as required by
the Communications Act of 1934.[98] Broadcasters have been forced to "settle for First Amendment Lite,
rather than the more filling brew," with a variety of illogical rationales leading to schizophrenic jurisprudence
for cable as well.[99]

{46} The chapter continues on to examine speech regulation of public carriers, private carriers, and private
self-censorship. The major public carrier, the United States Postal Service, used to be a flash point for debate
over whether the federal mail monopoly permitted the mails to be used as an instrument of censorship to ban
immoral, indecent, fraudulent, and obscene materials from the mails. Since 1945, the rule has been that any
communication carried by the Post Office is protected by the First Amendment.[100] The First Amendment
only prevents the government from limiting speech through state action.[101] Where the government is not
involved, there is no First Amendment restriction on censorship, thus permitting a private carrier to censor all
it dislikes. Yet the government often restricts free speech of carriers, such as cable, that are granted an
exclusive franchise. If the grant of an exclusive franchise permits the government to limit free speech, the
authors recommend instead that it is the granting of the exclusive franchise itself that should be eliminated.
[102]
{47} A crucial benefit of high-technology broadband is that viewers may seek what they find acceptable, so
that "community standards" for obscenity and indecency become defined by a group connected to a particular
electronic site rather than a group of provincial residents in Imuptight City. "Communities of speakers and
listeners can become completely voluntary on both sides. . . . Deviance loses its meaning when communities
of like-minded are formed entirely by consent."[103] Thus, no one can be offended unless they choose to
assume the risk of being offended.[104]
{48} Typical government regulation in electronic speech involves programming requirements that dictate
what content must be promoted, rather than banning any particular content.[105] Where funding is provided
by the government, even greater control over broadcasters is exercised over speech, such as rules promoting
"minority and diverse audiences" and "objectivity and balance" in programming.[106] As is characteristic of
telecommunications regulation, the rules differ for each technology. For example, direct broadcast satellites
have no programming requirements other than political broadcasting rules.[107] The trend here is clear; the
FCC's reliance on market forces solidified only recently, leaving more recent technologies like DBS with
fewer regulatory burdens.[108]
{49} Another notable First Amendment issue surveyed is commercial advertising. Various advertisements
have received various treatment. Fraudulent advertising is banned outright, with no constitutional concerns.
[109] Broadcasters and eventually cable operators were required to indicate sponsorship identification.[110]
Although the loophole of cameras focusing on printed tobacco advertisements at athletic games has recently
been criticized, tobacco advertising on electronic media has technically been banned since 1969.[111] The
liability of on-line service providers who advertise without editing content was also discussed. The successful
operation of these services as an electronic forum is completely dependent on limiting their liability.[112] The
problem stems from the blurring of the roles of common carrier and publisher. Movement away from either
pigeonhole creates either additional liability or loss of editorial discretion. This issue is also seen in the cable
context, where cable operators may have "no general power to control the content of programming"[113]
while at the same time they are required by a franchise contract to avoid any "obscene or otherwise
unprotected programming."[114] The authors survey several other timely First Amendment topics in this
chapter, such as indecency by carrier or telephone, violence, the "V-Chip" for viewer self-censorship,[115]
and political speech and campaign spending limits.

L. Chapter 12 - Universal Service
{50} Chapter Twelve closes the book by exploring the utopian vision of "Universal Service" for telephone,
television, cable, and eventually video dialtone and digital telephone. The authors suggest that a major flaw in
this universal service premise is that attempting to provide the same service for everyone results in a
mediocre product with limited capabilities. This is somewhat analogous to broadcast content that panders to

the masses. As with telephone and cable, the authors state that a broadband service must be provided to some
consumers to test for a basic level of service people will actually use.[116] The other important aspect of
universal service is price averaging, where low-cost users pay higher rates to subsidize high cost users[117]
and where everyone pays a smaller share of the initial fixed costs.[118] This is typically accomplished
through franchise regulations or economic imperatives to ensure that service providers connect wires to both
rich and poor homes alike.[119]
{51} Rather than use government regulation to promote an inefficient and costly broadband that few will
want, the authors argue, the market should be left alone.[120] The authors examine previous government
delay of radio, pay television, and cable development, and imply that the government is likely to use
regulation to similarly hinder rapid development of new broadband technology to protect existing
technologies.[121] Heavy lobbying by existing telecommunications interests for regulatory protection from
new technologies hinders rapid market development as well. The authors posit that limited regulation will
permit competition to create universal service. Although federal law does not mandate universal service,
earlier regulation and local franchising have promoted cable so it is now wired into 97 percent of all
television owning households in the United States.[122] Telephone service exists in 93 percent of all
households in the United States.[123] As for satellite dishes, the federal government has promoted open entry
for new competitors by superseding state attempts to promote universal service via exclusive franchises.[124]
One recent technology, direct broadcast satellites, has received the FCC's blessing to develop into a universal
service with minimal concern and regulation regarding potential impact on existing cable and broadcast
universal service.[125]
{52} As for universal broadband into every home, the authors foresee "a government policy to promote more
universal supply of more bandwidth."[126] This will require significant amounts of money, for which all
technologies must pay equally if equity is to be maintained. one fairly good suggestion is "a tax on users or
providers of telecommunications equipment and services, analogous to the gasoline tax used to fund federal
highways."[127] From an engineering standpoint, universal service could be achieved most efficiently by
"serv[ing] urban consumers by wire, and rural ones by wireless."[128] Although the authors acknowledge
that current rules against cross-ownership may preclude this vision, new legislation discussed briefly below
could rectify this situation.
{53} The book closes by describing two possible broadband paths. One path has the government using price
averaging, cross-subsidy, redistribution, monopoly and exclusive franchises, and a whole slew of other
regulations to control and hinder broadband development. In the words of one famous lyricist, broadband is
"like a river that don't know where it's flowin'"--likely to chart a course that cannot be meticulously planned
by regulators.[129] The other, and more likely, path is that competition will rapidly drive prices downward as
technology improves. To promote competition, the authors conclude, the government should instead use
expanded access requirements to prevent discrimination and require services to be offered "to all potential
customers at the same price."[130]

III. CONCLUSION
{54} Federal Broadband Law covers a wide variety of telecommunications technology and law, including the
development of various broadband technologies, the legal framework permitting FCC regulation, exclusive
franchises and licenses, and common carriage. It also discusses the difficulties associated with pricing a wide
array of equipment and services, vertical integration and horizontal cross-ownership restraints, copyright law,
and the impact of each on First Amendment rights. Yet with all the detail, the book still remains reasonably
accessible to the interested layperson. The book is well organized for the most part and worth the time for
those without knowledge that are interested in learning about telecommunications language and law. It will
also serve the experienced "telepractitioner" as a handy guide book containing references to the statutes and

many of the regulations and treaties most relevant to telecommunications law.
{55} One leaves the book with the big picture view that the fragmented rules and regulations of the
telecommunications field are a nightmare for the regulated industries and a boon for those with the biggest
influence on legislation. This reviewer would suggest that the FCC and Congress institute periodic review of
regulations to ensure that those regulations, while well planned to protect certain telecommunications
industries in their infancy, do not create an unfair advantage or a restrictive nightmare once that industry has
matured. Furthermore, this reviewer hopes, as the authors seem to conclude, that merging technologies and
greater competition will promote a more even regulatory playing field and perhaps even decrease
telecommunications regulation overall where competition thrives.[131]
{56} Pending legislation before Congress may provide the most radical overhaul of telecommunications law
since the 1934 Communications Act. Key features of this legislation include loosening of ownership
restrictions, partially eliminating video and long distance service bans on local telephone carriers,
deregulating cable pricing, and implementing some version of indecency-type content restrictions.[132] With
the exception of increased content regulations that may violate the First Amendment, these proposed features
appear to be a step in the direction of reducing governmental intrusion into the burgeoning
telecommunications industry, and another notch in the predictive powers of the authors of Federal
Broadband Law.
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